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Drafi Recommendation
on the situalion infonner Yugoslnia
The Assembly,
(i) Profoundly shocked by the ease with which the Bosnian Serbs were able to seize United Nations
blue berets, hold them hostage and steal armaments and equipment guarded by United Nations personnel
in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
(ii) Dismayed by the apparent powerlessness of the international community to prevent Bosnian Serbs
from continuing to massacre civilians in safe areas, particularly in Tuzla, on 25th May 1995, with a toll of
more than 76 dead and 150 wounded, surrounding and shelling the town of Sarajevo and disrupting the
provision of United Nations humanitarian aid to ttre civilian population;(iii) Noting also the powerlessness of the international community to prevent Croatian forces from
resuming hostilities against the Krajina region, in violation of the cease-fire agreed in respect of Croatia
on 29th March 1994, and despite present negotiations to find an acceptable political arrangement concer-
ning the status of Krajina;(iv) Convinced that the time has come either to take vigorous measures to put an end to action by the
Bosnian Serbs, nvo of whose political leaders are accused of war crimes before the International Court in
The Hague, who are continuing to humiliate the United Nations and the entire international community, or
to withdraw United Nations forces from the region;(v) Recalling that the Presidential Committee, on23rd September 1991, asked the WEU Council " to
invite the United Nations Security Council to set up an effective United Nations force to secure a cease-
fre in Yugoslavia " and stated that " WEU stands ready to play its fu[ part in any such proposal ";(vi) Recalling that Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) gaveawide mandate to UNPROFOR allow-
ing it to resort to force in order to give effective protection to safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina;
(vii) Recalling therefore paragraphs 2 and 3 of Recommendation 541 inviting the WEU Council to
'o ensure the sftict application of Resolution 836 ... adopted by the Security Council on 4th June 1993 " and,
" inparticular heJn the_ adjustrnent and reinforcement of forces of WEU counties that may be required by
the implementatiol of Resolution 836 " and " consider assigning some of these forces to the support of
units responsible for protecting security areas ";
(uiri) Considering in consequence that the decision to create a rapid reaction force for former Yugoslavia
taken in Paris on 3rd June 1995 is an appropriate 
- 
if belated 
- 
measure falling within the framework of
the implementation of Security Council Resolution 836, but regretting that the mission and status of this
force are somewhat ambiguous;
(i.x) Deeply regtetting, nevertheless, the WEU Council's total absence of initiative, despite the under-
taking on crisis-management given by member governments in their Petersberg declaration;(x) Astounded that,_dcspite opelation Deny Flight, the United Nations authorities have recorded, up to
the month of April 1995, over 4 29O violatons of the ban on mittary flights in the air space over Bosiria-
Herzegovina;
@) Dismayed, moreover, by the blatant contradiction between the WEU Council's afErmation of 'o the
successful results accomplished by the WEU police and customs mission on the Danube " and " the conti-
nued positive results achieved in the joint WEU-NATO operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic " and
Igpo-rls of large quantities of fuel being smuggled into the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia(Serbia and Montenegro) through Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and also
through the territory of neighbouring countries;
(xii) Considcring that the trade embargo Greece has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia is placing this country in such a difficult economic situation that, in ordeito surviv-e, it is forced to
maintain some comnercial relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in violation of United
Nations sanctions against the latter;
(xiii) SflIJ convinced that the effectiveness of the embargo banning arms supplies to the whole of the ter-
ritory o-f former_Yugoslavia continues to be one of the essential conditions foiachieving a peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict in that region;
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(xiy,) Disturbed by the contradictory declarations of United States political leaders regarding the policy
and r61e of the United States in the conflict in the Balkans;
(xv) Concerned also that the lack of clarity regarding Russia's r6le in its relations with the Federal Repu-
blic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) raises problems, but welcoming the meeting betwggn thg
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia and the new European Union negotiator, Mr. Carl Bildt, which will
hopefully clarify the sinration and lead to a more coherent approach within the contact group and the Z-4
$oup;(ni) Convinced that a peaceful settlement of the conflict in former Yugoslavia is possible only if all
international organisations and countries participate in efforts to this end, agreeing on a joint sfategy and
refraining from isolated and unco-ordinated initiatives;
(nii) RecalTing that the danger of the Yugoslav conflict spreading and escalating into a wider regional
con{lict is still present,
RrcovnrimNns rHAT run CotrNcn-
1. Resolutely call upon the Bosnian Serbs to free immediately and unconditionally all the blue berets
they still hold hostage;
2. Appeal to all parties concerned to abandon once and for all the illusion of a military so-lution-and
rather wbik to achieve a political solution based on fair negotiations through which the rights of all ethnic
and religious communities can be guaranteed;
3. Ask all international organisations, the European Union and all countries involved in the peace
efforts 
- 
and above all the members of the contact group 
- 
to sfengthen their cohesion by adopting a joint
sEategy and to refrain from isolated and unco-ordinated initiatives;
4. Ask the United Nations to strengthen the presence and action of the blue berets and request all
governments to make the necessary manpower, resources and means available to the United Nations;
5. Strengthen the operability of the rapid reaction force created on the initiative of France and the Uni-
ted Kingdom by giving its command respbnsibility for on the spot initiatives require{ in certain situations
that endanger the safefu and lives of UNPROFOR troops or of some of its own members;
6. Transform the rapid reaction force into a European multinational unit placed under the authority of
WEU in accordance with the arrangements decided at Petersberg and invite all WEU member countries to
participate;
7. Take steps in the United Nations to obtain a mandate from the Security Council for WEU to elabo-
rate and implement the tasks of this multinational force within the framework of the guidelines issued by
the Security Council;
8. Urge the Security Council to ensure that the task of the European multinational force is to facilitate
the impleinentation of the missions of the blue berets in former Yugoslavia and not to prepare for their
withdrawal;
9. Ask the Security Council to provide all the means necessary for supervisir-rg moqe effectivelythe
domestic and internatibnal borders of the successor republics of former Yugoslavia, the better to monitor
the effectiveness of the arms embargo;
10. Ask the United States to reverse its decision to participate no longer in the embargo against Bosnia-
Herzegovina;
11. Ask the Government of Russia to use its influence in conformity with the the proposals of the
contact group and with the agreement of is member countries;
12. ln co-ordination with NATO, take the necessary measures to prevent any further violation of the
flight exclusion zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina;
13. Take appropriate measures to prevent any violation of the embargo on arms supplies to the territory
of former Yugoslavia and inform the Assembly of all proven cases of sanctions-breaking;
14. Request Greece forthwith to lift the trade embargo it has imposed on the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia;
15. Provide the Assembly with more accurate and detailed information regarding the effectiveness of
operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard and the monitoring of shipping on the Danube;
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16. Ask the United Nations and the European Union to offer compensation to neighbouring countries
whose economies have been weakened by their participation in the embargo against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia;
17. Ask the Croatian Government not to undertake further military action against the United Nations
safe areas since these areas, which belong to the Republic of Croatia, must be integrated peacefully and
given autonomy, as proposed by the Z-4 group;
18. Ask the Government in Belgrade to bring all possible pressure to bear on Bosnian Serb leaders to
persuade them to accept the proposals of the contact group;
19. Furthermore ask the Government in Belgrade to recognise the borders of Croatia and, explicitly,
Bosnia's right to exist as a sovereign state within its present borders, given that the constitutional-frame-
work and territorial organisation of the Bosnian state are to be established by consensus in negotiations on
the basis of the proposals made by the contact group;
20. Call on the Government in Belgrade to restore autonomous structures to Kosovo and Vojvodina and
review its arrangements for minorities in the Sandjak and elsewhere;
21. Oppose any suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro) until such time as it recognises Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as defined by their international
borders;
22. Actively support the resumption of the political dialogue with a view to:
- 
achieving a lasting cease-fire over the whole of the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- 
reaching a peaceful and political settlement of the conflict as a whole on the basis of the peace
plans drawn up by the contact group and the Z-4 group;
- 
avoiding the conflict escalating into a wider regional conflict;
- 
convening, at the appropriate time, a peace conference with the participation of the political
leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
23. While recognising the many conmibutions made by the international community, ask all govern-
ments to step up their efforts in the area of humanitarian aid for civilians and refugees;
24. Ask all govemments to support the work of the International War Crimes Tribunal.
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Exphnatory Memorandam
(submifred, by Mn Fassino, Rapporteur)
I.Introductian
1. The four-month truce concluded on 31st
December 1994 between the Bosnian Govern-
ment and Bosnian Serbs with the help of former
United States President, Jimmy Carter, held no
hope for an end to hostilities, let alone the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Initially, the truce succee-
ded in halting the fighting. However, as the date
of its expiry approached, in particular, from 20th
March 1995, fighting was resumed with increased
ferocity in nearly all the regions concerned, first
around Bihac, then near Tirzla and in the Vlasic
mountains.
2. The resumption of Serb attacks against the
town of Sarajevo provoked two air strikes (one on
25th May, the other on 26th May 1995) carried
out by NATO at the request of the United Nations
against Bosnian Serb munitions depots. The Bos-
nian Serbs reacted by shelling the town of Tuzla,
causing many dead and wounded among the civi-
lian population, and by taking some 400 blue
berets hostage in several parts of Bosnia. On 2nd
June 1995, the Serbs liberated 126 of them, but
the same day, an American F-16 was shot down in
Bosnia by a Serb missile and Serbs again took
United Nations troops hostage.
II. The situatian after the ueation of a rapid
reactinnforce based in Croatia and Bosnia
3. After the United Kingdom Government
decided to send reinforcements to improve the
protection of British forces assigned to UNPRO-
FOR in Bosnia, France convened a conference in
Paris, on 3rd June 1995, of the fifteen defence
ministers of the countries of the European Union
and of the Atlantic Alliance participating in the
peace-keeping effort on the spot. This conference
decided to send to Bosnia a rapid reaction force of
some 10 000 men to provide backing for UNPRO-
FOR, prevent the taking of hostages and facilitate
the free movement of convoys. On 6th June, the
Bosnian Serbs released a further 108 blue berets,
while continuing to hold some 150 United
Nations soldiers hostage. Although, as from 13th
June, Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic several
times announced the liberation of all the remai-
ning blue berets, on 15th Jute,26 blue berets and
United Nations military observers were still being
held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs.
4. The French and United Kingdom Govern-
ments, in particular, which have the largest num-
ber of blue berets on the spot, believe the new
force should not be placed under United Nations
command. However, following a compromise, it
was decided that it would act under United
Nations' authority. It will be based in Croatia and
Bosnia 
- 
near Sarajevo 
- 
under the operational
command of the UNPROFOR commander for the
whole of former Yugoslavia, the French General
Bernard Janvier, with authority delegated to the
commander of the blue berets in Bosnia, the Bri-
tish General Rupert Smith. France and the United
Kingdom 
- 
which already have the largest num-
bers of blue berets in former Yugoslavia 
- 
will
provide the majority of the rapid reaction troops,
divided into two brigades, as follows:
(i) A multinational brigade of 1 500
French, 1 500 United Kingdom and
some 200 Dutch soldiers (The Hague
talks of 170 Royal Netherlands
marines).
(ii) The 5 O00-strong United Kingdom 24
air-mobile brigade. France has also a
supplementary force of 4 000 men on
alert.
5. The United Kingdom has just sent artillery
engineering and communications units and heli-
copters for the rapid reaction force. The Nether-
lands marines will be equipped with 120 mm mor-
tars and a trajectory calculation (mortar detection)
unit'. This force will therefore be wholly Euro-
pean; no participation is envisaged by American
or Russian forces in the framework of this multi-
national unit. However, the Americans have sent
the aircraft-carrier Theodore Roosevelt with a
crack unit of 2 000 marines to the Adriatic and the
aircraft-ca:rier Foch is also off the Bosnian coast.
6. It is still not known exactly what the status
and tasks of this new rapid reaction force will be.
However, it should be recalled in this connection
that, as far back as 19th September 1991, Chan-
cellor Kohl and President Mitterrand had propo-
sed sending an intervention force to Yugoslavia
under United Nations' auspices. This proposal
was rejected however at the time by the Council
of the European Community because the United
Kingdom was not then in favour of it.
l. Le Figaro, 5th June 1995.
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7. Moreover, the question arises as to whether
this initiative is compatible with the new United
Nations thinking on managing the crisis in the
Balkans. On 31st May 1995, the United Nations
Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, in
his report to the Security Council, presented four
options relating to a new r6le for the United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. These four options are as fol-
lows':
(i) withdrawal of UNPROFOR, which
would be replaced in Bosnia by a
small political mission if the parties
concerned so wished;
(ii) continuation of LJNPROFOR's pre-
sent tasks and methods of achieving
them;
(iii) a change in its mandate, in order to
allow greater use of military force;
(iv) a revised mandate, to cover in future
only the tasks that a peace-keeping
force can carry out realistically in the
prevailing circumstances in Bosnia.
8. The United Nations Secretary-General is
clearly in favour of option (iv),bat he stipulates
that whatever the final decision may be, it will
not be effective without real prospects for a nego-
tiated solution, in other wordso relaunching and
intensifying the peace process through a new and
meaningful initiative. The United Nations Secre-
tary-General makes no mention of the rapid reac-
tion force that is the wish of Paris and London and
whose creation was decided in Paris on 3rd June
1995. He has never concealed the fact that he is
opposed to any offensive r6le for the blue berets
or any other force connected with the United
Nations' mandate in Bosnia.
9. Several other questions arise, however: the
Bosnians' greatest fear is that a change in the
mandate and redeployment of the blue berets
would simply mean the withdrawal of United
Nations forces from particularly dangerous
regions. This is how, for example, Mr. Akashi's
proposal for the demilitarisation of the Bosnian
enclaves of Sebrenica,Zepa and Gorazde is being
interpreted.
10. Furthermore, the Bosnians fear that the
only task of the rapid reaction force and the addi-
tional United Kingdom troops already in the area
will be to protect their UNPROFOR colleagues
and that protection of the safe areas will finally be
abandoned.
11. Above all, one might wonder what was the
pupose of the conference of defence ministers
convened in Paris on 3rd June 1995 and what
decisions were taken. According to the press 3,
France invited fourteen ministers and the chiefs-
of-staff of the following countries: Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States. A member of the Russian Embassy in
Paris represented Russia as an observer. United
Nations, NATO and WEU officials were also pre-
sent. If the aim was to bring together representa-
tives of all the countries which have blue berets in
the area, one may wonder why Germany and
Greece were invited. It should further be recalled
that forces from the Baltic countries and Argen-
tine, Bangladeshi, Czech, Egyptian, Indonesian,
Jordanian, Kenyan, Malaysian, Nepalese, New
Zealar'd, Pakistani, Polish, Russian, Slovakian
and Ukrainian forces are also involved.
12. It is understandable that the seizure of hos-
tages called for rapid action. It is more than sur-
prising, nevertheless, that Portugal, which occu-
pies the chairmanship-in-office of the WEU
Council, was not invited to the conference.
Moreover, one has to note, in relation to the Bos-
nian crisis, that the WEU governmental authori-
ties have been conspicuous for their total silence
since the ministerial meeting in Lisbon on 15th
May.
13. Sir Dudley Smith, President of the WEU
Assembly, alone launched an urgent appeal on
Z9thMay 1995 for all European countries to send
troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina on a scale similar
to the deployments already undertaken by France
and the United Kingdom. " It is now up to the
WEU family of twenty-seven nations to show the
leadership which has been so sadly lacking where
the United Nations is concerned " he said. On lst
June 1995, under the title " WEU must be the hard
core of European security ", the President of the
Assembly of WEU, while welcoming Britain and
France's initiative in creating a rapid reaction
force to help the United Nations, requested the
WEU chairmanship-in-ofEce to " ensure that we
take the lead at Saturday's ministerial gathering in
Paris as well ". He also stressed that it was vital to
consult WEU's associate partners.
14. At political level, there is no indication rhat
an arrangement between the Serbs and Bosnians
in Bosnia-Herzegovina might be in sight. The r6le
of the Belgrade Government remains ambiguous.
Despite several encouraging signs from Mr. Milo-
sevic, the latter has so far refused to recognise
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and there were
serious doubts about whether the decision taken
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) to break off all relations with the
Bosnian Serbs and close the frontier between
2. Le Monde, 2nd June 1995. 3. Le Figaro,5thJune 1995.
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Yugoslavia and Bosnia is actually being imple-
mented.
15. There remains the problem of the Krajina
region in Croatia. The decision of the United
Nations Security Council contained in Reso-
lution 981, dated 3lst March 1995, to replace
UNPROFOR in Croatia by UNCRO, a United
Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in
Croatia, for a period ending 30th November 1995,
which would provide supervision of the interna-
tional frontiers between the Republic of Croatia,
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mon-
tenegro), did not obtain the backing of the Krajina
authorities.
16. Early in May 1995, the Croats violated the
cease-fre agreement of 29thMarch l994by laun-
ching a military offensive in the area of western
Slavonia, pushing back the line of the Krajina
Serb militiain the Pacrac region by some 20kmin
order to clear a sfretch of motorway linking eas-
tern and western Croatia, which had been cut by
the formation of a Serb enclave. The Serbs reacted
by shelling the town of Zagreb with Orkan mis-
siles which caused deaths among the civilian
population. A temporary cease-fue was conclu-
ded with the help of Mr. Akashi, the United
Nations representative, but the situation remains
very tense and is a cause for concern in the region,
even after the agreement signed on 15th May ber
ween Croatia and the United Nations on the new
status of UNCRO forces. Moreover, tension is
evident in Krajina where Prime Minister Mikelic,
one of the moderate leaders, has been removed
from office.
17. It is still impossible to assess the conse-
quences of the escalation of the Bosnian crisis for
the survival of the federation approved between
Croats and Bosnians in Bosnia or for the adminis-
tration of the town of Mostar by the European
Union.
18. Regarding the territory of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, continued encroachment
to the detriment of Albanians, Bosnians, Hunga-
rians and Croats in the Kosovo region, the Sand-jak and Vojvodina, offers an insight into the
extreme complexity of the situation in this trou-
bled region of Europe.
19. The decision taken by the United States no
longer to participate in monitoring the embargo
on arms intended for Bosnia and the resolution
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly
on 3rd November 1994 
- 
at the initiative of the
United States 
- 
asking for the embargo on Bosnia
to be lifted, primarily supported by Islamic coun-
tries while European countries and Russia abstai-
ned, resulted in the conflict in Bosnia helping to
increase the tension that already existed between
Europe and Islam in other regions of the world.
20. The lack of coherence that characterises
western policy was further aggravated by the ini-
tiative taken by the United States to negotiate
directly with the Bosnian Serbs despite United
Nations Security Council Resolution 942, wtich,
in September 1994, recommended that no form of
political negotiations should be conducted with
the Bosnian Serbs as long as the latter refused to
accept the peace plan for Bosnia proposed by the
contact group.
21. Even after the decision to create a rapid
reaction force in Bosnia, the future r6le of the blue
berets in the region remains uncertain and the lack
of coherence in the political strategy followed by
the United Nations, NAIO, the European Union
and WEU and the United States and Russia
illustrates how difficult it is to envisage an equi-
table and lasting solution to the conflict before
it reaches proportions far beyond anything yet
seen.
22. Slovenia remains the only counfiry to emer-
ge from former Yugoslavia which has managed to
stay on the sidelines of the conflict in the Balkans
and to establish suitable conditions for ensuring
its political stability and economic recovery, des-
pite a difficult period of transition and the large
number of refugees the counfiry has had to take in.
The imminent signature of a Europe Agreement
between Slovenia and the European Union is an
encouraging sign of the country's drawing closer
to the European Union.
III. The situatian on the spot
(a) Bosnia-Henegovina
23. In Resolution9S2, adopted on 3lst March
1995, the Security Council of the United Nations
decided to extend the mandate of UNPROFOR in
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for a further
period ending on 30th November 1995. The Secu-
rity Council sftessed, in this context, " the respon-
sibility of the parties and others concerned " in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as regards
UNPROFOR safety and protection and demanded
" all parties and others concerned " to refrain from
any acts of intimidation or violence against
TJNPROFOR.
24. At the same time, it urged the Bosnian par-
ties to agtee forthwith on a further extension and
on the implementation of the cease-fire agree-
ments beyond 30th April 1995 and to use that per-
iod to negotiate an overall peaceful settlement on
the basis of the acceptance of the contact group
peace plan as a starting point. It further asked the
Bosnian Serbs to accept this proposal.
25. However, neither this resolution nor Reso-
lution 987 dated 19th April 1995 had any practical
effect. The reality is that, as of 16th June 1995, the
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Serbs had still not released all the blue berets they
were holding hostage. While fighting continues
between the Bosnian Serbs and government
forces, tension is rising around Sarajevo since the
Bosnian army began to concentrate a large force
some 40 miles from Sarajevo for a purpose which
is still not clear, although according to several
obsei'uers, this force seerns to be inten-ded to break
the Serb encirclement of the Bosnian capital.
26. Among the many areas of tension in Bos-
nian territory there is another sensitive area in the
Brcko region where the Croatian Serbs occupy
only a narrow corridor between the Croatian bor-
der and the territory of the Bosnian federation
established by the Muslims and Croats. There are
signs that General Mladic, the leader of the Bos-
nian Serbs, will bry to widen this corridor in order
to prevent Serb-occupied territory in Bosnia being
divided into two separate parts. In December
1994, the Bosnian Serbs had already expelled all
the United Nations military observers from the
Brcko region and Eansferred them to Belgrade to
make it impossible to observe directly what was
happening in that regiono.
27. Moreover, quarrels have apparently broken
out between Croas and Bosnian Muslims over the
organisation of the federation to which they had
agreed in Washington on 18th March 1994 ttranks
to the mediation of the United States and Russia-
(The Bosnian Serbs had rejected this federation,
with the exception of the Council of o'moderate "
Serbs around Sarajevo, which supports the Bosnian
Government.) Nevertheless, the agreement between
the two parties signed in Bonn on 10th March 1995,
which provides specifically for granting the federal
bodies all the powers embodied in the constitution
of the federation, together with the adoption of a
plan for the retum of refugees and displaced per-
sons, is a positive step according to the report sub
mitted by the United Nations Secretary-General to
the Security Council on 22nd March 1995'. All pro-
blems are still far from being settled, however.
28. These difficulties have repercussions in
particular on the administration of the town of
Mostar, for which the European Union has had
responsibility, with the assistance of WEU, since
23rd July 1994, under the direction of Hans
Koschnik, former burgomaster of the town of
Bremen. In order to re-establish a common poli-
ce force in the town for Croats and Muslims,
WEU committed itself to assisting the European
Union administrator by setting up a multinational
police force of approximately 200 officers.
However, to date, it is still not clear whether this
force has actually been brought up to full strength.
Nevertheless, in their Lisbon declaration dated
15th May 1995, the WEU Ministers 'o welcomed
4. The Times, 14th December 1994.
5. Document Sl 19951222.
the agreement between the parties concerned on
the implementation of the first phase of the estab-
lishment of a unified police force of Mostar(UPFM) and regarding the structure of the future
UPFM. They believe that these important steps
should lead to the implementation of the UPFM.
Ministers agreed to continue to encourage the par-
ties, in particular via the presidency, to secure
agreement to the subsequent implementation
phases and the establishment of the UPFM.
Ministers welcomed the forthcoming participa-
tion of Austria, Finland and Sweden in the WEU
police element, in addition to the contributions
provided by the member states. 'o
29. The re-establishment of an adminisfration
in Mostar is regarded as a test of the viability of the
Bosnian-Croat Federation. However, the results
obtained so far by Mr. Koschnik are not particul-
arly encouraging. In January, he accused the
Croats in particular of hindering his task. He noted
in a communiqu6 that the town remained comple-
tely divided between the Bosnians who control the
eastern part, and the Croats who control the wes-
tern part. The adminisfration specifically accuses
the Croats of holding up the formation of mixed
Muslim-Croat-European patrols, which is
delaying the re-establishment of free movement
throughout the town. Moreover, in early April, Mr.
Koschnik stated that he was convinced that the
embargo against Bosnia would primarily harm the
civilian population while doing nothing to prevent
the clandestine importation of armaments into the
Balkansu. Your Rapporteur will return to the ques-
tion of the embargo in a later chapter.
30. As to monitoring the prohibition of military
flights in the air space of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
accordance with United Nations Security Council
Resolution 816 (1993), the United Nations Secre-
tary-General reports regularly to the Security Coun-
cil on information received by UNPROFOR regar-
ding apparent violations. According to the most
recent report of which your Rapporteur is awme (9th
April 1995)? covering the period 30th March to 2nd
April 1995, it would appear thatZl akcraft or heli-
copter flights took place in the airspace over Bosnia-
Herzegovina- According to the report the total num-
ber of flighs regarded as apparent violations stands
at present (9th April 1995) at 4 2901.
31. One may wonder why the WEU Council
does not communicate any information on these
violations and their implications. It does however
emerge from the report of the United Nations
Secretary-General dated22nd March 1995E that
NAIO, at the request of UNPROFOR, is conti-
nuing to monitor and enforce the flight exclusion
zone. According to this report " the 'no-fly-zone'
6. Frankfurter Allgemeine 7*ilng,4th April 1995.
7. United Nations document Sll995l Add.24.
8. United Nations document 5119951222.
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enforcement has successfully prevented the use by
the waning sides of offensive air power and the
availability of NATO air power has considerably
strengthened UNPROFOR's bargaining position
in negotiating convoy clearances ". The United
Nations Secretary-General is keen to " emphasise
that, despite regular frequent infringements of the
'no-fly-zone' by helicopters and some occasional
fixed-wing activity " he remains " convinced that
the deterrent effect of NATO operations has contri-
buted to the effective containment of warring fac-
tions' air activity for combat purposes ". One may
wonder whether such an assessment is still valid,
particularly after the Serbs succeeded, on 2nd
June, in shooting down an American F-16 aircraft
over Bosnian territory.
32. It should also be recalled that, on 4th
August 1994"the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Seibia and Montenegro) had decided to break off
political and economic relations with the " Repu-
blic Srpska " representing the Bosnian Serbs, to
prohibil the Bosnian Serb leaders from visiting
Federal Yugoslav Republic territory and to close
its border with Serb-controlled Bosnian territory
to all forms of transport except that carrying food-
stuffs, clothing and medicines.
33. Following a report submitted on llth April
1995 by the co-Chairmen of the Steering Commit-
tee of the International Conference on former Yugo-
slavia to the United Nations Secretary-Generale :
" In light of the foregoing developments
during the past 30 days, based on the mis-
sion's on-site observation, and based on the
advice of the mission co-ordinator, Mr. T. J.
Nieminen, and in the absence of any confra-
ry information from the atr, whether the air-
borne reconnaissance system of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or
national technical means, and aside from the
reported tracking of helicopters crossing the
border, the co-Chairmen conclude that the
Government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is
continuing to meet its commitrnent to close
the land border between the Federal Repu-
blic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina under the control of the Bos:
nian Serb forces. The co-Chairmen also
conclude that during the past 30 days there
were no commercial fransshipments across
the border between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. "
34. For that reason the United Nations Security
Council agreed in Resolution 988, dated 21st
April 1995, on a partial suspension of the econo-
mic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro) until 5th July
1995. However serious doubts remain about the
aims of Mr. Milosevic's policy towards the Bos-
nian Serbs and even his determination to break
with Mr. Karadzic. This attitude has, as yet, had
no influence whatsoever on the intransigence of
the Bosnian Serb leaders' position.
(b) The sifinlion in Croatia
35. Following the precarious truce established
in Croatia since the end of the Croat offensive
against the western sector of Krajina in early May
1995, trvo problems have to be dealt with: flrst,
avoiding a resumption of hostilities and, second,
finding a political solution to the future status of
the 'o Serb Republic of Krajina " proclaimed on
lgth December 1991 by the Serb minority estab-
lished on Croatian territory. It should be remem-
bered that Croatia has never relinquished its claim
to conffol this territory. After the end of the Serbo-
Croat war in autumn 199I, apeace plan signed by
the Croats on 3rd January 1992 provided for the
deployment of blue berets to disarm the rebel
militia and prepare for the return of refugees.
According toZagreb, these provisions were never
implemented and the blue berets served Serb
interests by maintaining the status quo in the terri-
tories occupied by the secessionist Serbs.
36. The new mandate of UNCRO forces in
Croatia, under the terms of United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution 981, dated 31st March
1995, and Resolution 990, therefore includes,
inter alia, controlling the movement of military
personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons
across the international borders between Croatia
and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at the
border crossings for which UNCRO is respon-
sible; this mandate further provides that UNCRO
is to facilitate the delivery of international huma-
nitarian assistance to Bosnia through the tenitory
of Croatia and monitor the demilitarisation of the
Prevlaka peninsula. Its aim is also to facilitate
implementation of the economic agreement
concluded on 2nd December 1994 between the
Croats and the Krajina authorities under the aus-
pices of the co-Chairmen of the International
Conference on former Yugoslavia.
37. To achieve its objectives, the Security
Council approved the implementation plan sub-
mitted by the United Nations Secretary-General
on 18th April 1995'0, which stated that a comple-
ment of some 8 750 noops would be sufficient. It
is therefore envisaged that the United Nations
forces curently in Croatia can be reduced to the
proposed level of 8 750 troops between now and
30th June 1995 and that deployment will be com-
pleted on that date.
9. Document Sll995l302,l3th April 1995. 10. United Nations document 5119951320.
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38. The implementation of this new plan has
been seriously called into question both by the
refusal of the Krajina Serbs to accept it and by the
Croatian offensive against the Serbs of western
Slovenia in early May 1995. Security Council
Resolution 994 dated 17th May 1995 therefore
calls upon the parties to complete without delay
the withdrawal of all their troops from the separa-
tion areas agreed in the cease-fre agreement and
refrain from any further violation of these areas; it
also calls for the status and mandate of UNCRO
to be respected and the safety and protection of
UNCRO personnel to be assured.
39. Even if the situation prevailing in Croatia
differs from that of Bosnia, principally because
the Krajina Serbs have not taken hostages among
the blue berets, it is impossible yet to predict the
consequences of the creation, agreed in Paris, of a
rapid reaction force on the evolution of events in
Croatia. The differences that divide the Serb
authorities of Krajina are deepening and the
departure of the moderate " head of govern-
ment ", Mr. Mikelic, is reinforcing the emerging
tendency in Krajina to reject the stationing of blue
berets in this territory and initiatives for unifying
Krajina and Bosnian Serb territory.
40. Such a development would have serious
consequences for the chances of plan Z-4 beng
accepted, in other words the draft agreement on
Krajina, Slavonia, southern Baranja and western
Sirmium worked out by the ambassadors to Croa-
tia of the United States and the Russian Federa-
tion and certain representatives of the internatio-
nal conference on the former Yugoslavia. This
arrangement provides for very wide autonomy for
the Serb minorities in Croatia and in particular the
right of Krajina Serbs to mint their own coinage
and have their own police force, if the Serbs reco-
gnise Croatia's sovereignty over that region and
over its international borders. If, conversely, a
unified Serbian state spanning Bosnian-Croatian
borders were to be proclaimed, this would not
only be the end of the contact group's peace plan,
which is based on the integnty of Bosnian terri-
tory but also that of theZ-4 group.
41. Regarding Croatia's internal policy, it
should be noted that the media and independent
information means are encountering difficulties in
relation to Mr. Tudjman's government which is
seeking to control and dominate them.
42. Apart from unresolved problems in other
Serb-occupied regions of Croatia such as Slavo-
nia, Croatia has an additional internal difficulty
linked to the status of Istria, which has, for some
years, been asking for greater autonomy from the
government n Zagreb. The region, which has an
Italian minority of some 30 000 out of a total of
250 000 inhabitants, was divided into two parts
following the creation of the independent states of
Slovenia and Croatia after the collapse of Yugo-
slavia. In early February, the Croatian Constitu-
tional Court ruled that Croatian Istria's indepen-
dent status was largely unconstitutional and
repealed several articles, including those relating
to the rights of the Italian minority and the right to
use the Italian language on a par with Croatian.
This decision by the Constitutional Court
confirms the cenffalising tendency of the Croatian
Government which is leading it to curtail the auto-
nomy of national minorities and local authorities
alike. It is giving rise to acute concern among the
population of Istria and the ethnic Italian
community.
(c) The situation in the tormer Yugoslav Republit
of Macedania(FYROM)
43. The relatively small number of Serbs living
on FYROM tenitory (approximately 2.2Vo of the
population) has certainly helped to keep this coun-
try out of the fighting and to bring about an agree-
ment between Macedonia and former Yugoslavia
in September 1993, establishing the rights of the
Serbian minority. It would appear from a report of
the United Nations Secretary-Ge neral dated, 22nd
March 19951' that the government of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia expressed the
wish that United Nations forces stationed in that
country should be separate from UNPROFOR. The
United Nations Security Council therefore agreed,
in Resolution 983 dated 31st March 1995, that in
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
UNPROFOR would in future be known as the Uni-
ted Nations preventive deployment force (JNPRE-
DEF) and that its mandate would cover a period
ending on 30th November 1995.
4. In the light of Belgrade's equivocal attitude
towards Macedonia (and taking account also of
that counbry's differences with Greece), the most
widely publicised international effort to prevent
armed conflict in the FYROM has undoubtedly
been the preventive deployment of United
Nations forces. United Nations Security Council
Resolution 795 of 11th December 1992had
authorised the deployment of an infantry battalion
and observers to monitor the FYROM's border
with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia. On 18th June 1993, the United Nations
Security Council authorised sending reinforce-
ments of 1 000 American troops. At the end of
March 1995, the true number of American forces
in Macedonia was 540 men, reinforced by a Nor-
dic battalion of 556 troops to which must be
added 53 representatives of the command head-
quarters12. However the United States has still not
opened an embassy in Skopje.
ll. United Nations document 5119951222.
12. Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
29th March 199 5, 5 1 199 5 1222.
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45. While this preventive deployment, in
which mainly the United States participates (this
is.the only example of American participation in
the territory of former Yugoslavia), has contribu-
ted to stability in this region, it should be recalled
that, during the Political Committee's visit to
Washington in March 1995, an expert from the
Centre for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) nevertheless pointed to the growing risk of
conflict breaking out in the FYROM following
mounting tension between Macedonians and
Albanians. He did not even rule out the possibi-
lity of Bulgaria's becoming involved in such a
conflict.
46. The United Nations Secretary-General
states in his report dated 22nd March 1995 " that
the government of the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia conducted a nation-wide census
from 25th June to 1lth July 1994, in order to
establish accurate estimates of the ethnic compo-
sition of the population. This exercise is monito-
red, financed and partly organised by the Council
of Europe and the European Union. In November
t994, the government announced the results
which showed that 67Vo of the population were
ethnic Macedonians, 23Vo were ethnic Albanians
and the remaining l0Vo werc formed of Turks,
Serbs, Vlachs, gypsies and people of non-identi-
fied ethnicity. Ethnic Albanian leaders have dis-
puted the results, proffering a figure of 35Vo for
the ethnic Albanian population.
47. Again according to the report by the United
Nations Secretary-General, oo some leaders of the
ethnic Albanian population have stepped up
demands for improvements in their political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural and educational status,
including recognition of Albanian as the repu-
blic's second official language ". Confrontation
occurred on 17th February 1995 during a demons-
tration in favour of establishing an Albanian lan-
guage university at Tetovo.
48. Internal political, social and inter-ethnic
diffrculties continue to be exacerbated by the fra-
gile state of the economy of the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. According to the above
report of the United Nations Secretary-General,
" the trade embargo imposed by Greece in
February 1994, as well as United Nations sanc-
tions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) continue to disrupt
severely the country's principal export/import
routes on its southern and northern borders ".
49. The United Nations Secretary-General
notes that the monitoring carried out by the blue
berets along the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia's borders with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and with
Albania reveals no immediate military threat.
Yet, there has been no decisive move towards
establishing a clear international border between
Macedonia and Yugoslavia. There is only " a mili-
tary administrative boundary " between the two
parties. While UNPROFOR has monitored mili
tary patrols from both countries crossing the
boundary, it has observed no tension between the
two sides. However the potential for confronta-
tion still exists in the absence of an international
border recognised by both sides.
50. By all accounts, the balance of the situation
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
continues to be unstable and many FYROM poli-
ticians are convinced that Belgrade and Athens
are co-ordinating their policy against Skopje,
since neither Yugoslavia nor Greece is particular-
ly friendly to this small country which neither of
them recognises.
IV The implementatian of sanctions against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the effectiveness of the embargo
on annaments boundfor the tenitory
of fonner Yugoslavia
51. If information supplied by the WEU Coun-
cil, in particular in the second part of the fortieth
annual report of the Council to the Assembly, is to
be believed, it is a fact that the joint Council of
WEU and NATO noted in relation to operation
Sharp Guard that " the concept of operations
remained completely valid, taking into account
the adjustments made by the operational com-
manders ". We are also informed that the Planning
Cell presents weekly written situation reports to
the Permanent Council with the aim of informing
the Council about current operations such as Deny
Flight, Sharp Guard and the Danube embargo.
The presidency, for its part, has regularly briefed
the Council on developments in the WEU Danube
operation. According to the annual report, the
Council has also closely followed the conduct of
operation Sharp Guard to strengthen the embargo
in the Adriatic.
52. Whereas the Council is giving no concrete
information to the Assembly on the effectiveness
of the embargo, press reports suggest that arms fa-
ders are likely to have a field day throughout for-
mer Yugoslavia'a, which is somewhat disturbing.
Indeed, is it not to be feared that all the measures
to implement the embargo are proving ineffective
since arms and fuel are crossing the border by
clandestine means that are impossible to conffol?
53. Referred to primarily are the large arms
deliveries to Bosnia from Iran which are supposed
to have been made in May 1994. However, an
13. United Nations document 5119951222.
tt
14. Le Figaro, 15th March 1995.
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EU/OSCE Sanctions Assistance Mission exists in
Brussels under the chairmanship of the Italian
Ambassador Antonio Napolitano which reports
regularly on the situation regarding sanctions
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
According to press reports's:
" The sanctions were first imposed on
Yugoslavia by the United Nations in 1992,
and from the beginning they have been
porous. But conEols on the Danube and in
Bulgaria and Romania have reduced,
although not completely elimiated, trade
with Serbia along those routes.
Now, new routes have sprung up, principal-
Iy through Macedonia and Albania accor-
ding to American and European officials
throughout the region.
Nearly 5 000 trucks and I 200 rail cars
crossed from Macedonia into Serbia during
the first six weeks of this year carrying che-
micals, spare parts and metals, according to
a2lth.February report of the EU sanctions
comnussron.
A return flow of4 535 trucks andl 524rul
cars moved from Serbia into Macedonia,
according to the report, carrying shoes,
copper wire, furniture and tractors, the stuff
that brings in foreign exchange so that Ser-
bia can pay for the fuel and other strategic
needs being smuggled in.
The United States and the European Union
have virtually given up trying to enforce
the sanctions in Macedonia because the
country is suffering under its own econo-
mic embargo by Greece, arising out of a
feud over the use of the name Macedonia.
In Albania a leadership struggling with a
feeble economy is reluctant to interfere with
the trade that has made the country the
major route for fuel into Serbia, providing
an income for substantial numbers of Alba-
nians as well as revenue for the government.
The fuel Albanians are smuggling into Ser-
bia is coming from Greek and Italian oil
companies. For nine months last year,
Greek companies shipped nearly 22mtlhon
gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel to Alba-
nia, and Italian companies 14 million,
according to the commission.
American officials say that, at mosto half of
that was for domestic consumption, with
the rest going on to Serbia, where offrcials
say it is being used not for consumers, who
are suffering most from the sanctions, but
for Serbia's war machine. "
54. According to American intelligence
reports, Greek companies in particular are send-
ing thousands of barrels of fuel to Albania whence
most of these consignments are smuggled into
Yugoslavia. In March, Albania imported 9 000
more barrels a day than it needed for domestic
consumption. In January, the excess came to
3 645 banels a day. Greek companies have repla-
ced Italian ones as the principal source of fuel, the
intelligence reports show. But a Greek official
asserted that Italy, not Greece, was the main cul-
prit'u.
55. According to the American press '',
Washington has made repeated overtures to Greece
to exercise conhol over the trade. The response
has generally been that there is nothing illegal
about selling fuel to Albania. Italy has also ans-
wered in similar terms. Another report by the
sanctions commission of the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe indicated
that, after Albania, the most blatant violations of
sanctions could be attributed to Macedonia.
56. Moreovel in their Lisbon declaration of
15th May 1995, the WEU Ministers " welcomed
the successful results accomplished by the WEU
police and customs mission on the Danube, which
contribute to the full implementation of the
relevant United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions ... They also expressed their satisfaction at
the continued positive results achieved in the joint
WEU-NATO operation Sharp Guard in the Adria-
tic ". Bearing in mind all the above information,
this declaration seems to have no credibility what-
soever and to be remote from the real world.
57. In this context, it should be noted that on
5th April 1995 the Prime Minister of Bulgaria
said that it was urgently necessary to lift the
embargo against Yugoslavia which, in his view,
constituted an increasingly real threat to the stabi-
lity of third countries'8. According to the former
government of Mr. Luben Bero% Bulgaria suffe-
red direct and indirect losses worth $6.1 billion as
a result of the embargo against Yugoslavia. In
April too, China came out in favour of lifting
sanctions against Yugoslavia. As matters now
stand, the negotiators, endeavouring to offer Bel-
gtade a partial removal of the sanctions against
the country in exchange for Yugoslav recognition
of Croatia and Bosnia as defined by their intema-
tional borders are finding themselves in an increa-
singly weaker position.
58. Other questions arise, however: first, one
cannot help but wonder at the reaction of the
Security Council when informed of sanctions vio-
16. Intemational Herald Tribune, 2nd May 1995.
17. lntemational Herald Tribune,2nd May 1995.
18. Agence France Presse, 5th April 1995.15. Intemational Herald Tribune, l2th April 1995.
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lations. Second, the Council of WEU must be
required to give the Assembly specific informa-
tion about the effectiveness of the embargo, or
risk losing all credibility.
V The rdle of Belgrade
59. With regard to the situation in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),
developments in the Kosovo, Vojvodina and
Sandjak regions continue to give rise to concern.
In Kosovo province, the population of which is
90Vo Nbanian, there seems to be no hope of an
agreement being reached between the Albanian
community, which is demanding the restoration of
the independence it lost in 1990, and Belgrade,
which not only takes the view that Kosovo is an
integral part of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro) " but furthermore does not recognise any
form of autonomy for it. Given this situation, the
Geneva talks in the framework of the international
conference on Yugoslavia are making no headway
whatsoever and, in addition, thousands of ethnic
Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo have already left
the country for Albania. In any event, the problem
remains unsolved and might become a new sour-
ce of conflict in the Balkans.
60. [t seems that for Serbs, Kosovo has an
almost mythical significance. This attachment is
historically based, for Kosovo was once the seat
of a medieval Patriarchate and the centre of early
Serbian civilisation. Also, it was at Kosovo Polje
(the field of Kosovo), near Pristina, that Serbs
fought a much celebrated battle against the Turks
in 1389. Serbs see Kosovo as a central and inalie-
nable part of their civilisation.
61. In 1990, having put an end to the indepen-
dence Tito had granted Kosovo in 1974, Belgrade
imposed a harsh political and military r6gime on
the population of the region. Prominent ethnic
Albanians lost all the influential political and
administrative offices they had formerly held and
a 40 OOO-strong security force was set up in the
region. If the number of ethnic Albanian refugees
leaving Kosovo for Albania continues to increase
apace, the situation might dangerously deteriorate.
62. Also in 1990, Vojvodina,like Kosovo, lost
the independent status in Yugoslavia that it had
enjoyed since 1974. Serbs are in the majority in
this region, where they now account for 57Vo of
the population, followed by ITVo ethnic Hunga-
rians, the remainder being divided between
Romanians, Croats, Slovaks, Ruthenians and
Ukrainians. Not only do the non Serb minorities,
particularly the Hungarian minority, feel them-
selves victims of pressure from Belgrade as a
result of the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, they also believe that Belgrade is promoting
the seftlement of Serb refugees in Hungarian and
Croat-dominated regions of Vojvodina and even
encouraging ethnic cleansing to Serb advantage,
along with atrocities 
- 
of which proof exists 
-
against the Hungarian and Croat populations.
Another source of tension is the reluctance of the
non Serb minorities in Vojvodina to enlist in the
ranks of the army of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in order to
serve the cause of " Greater Serbia ". Roughly
25 000 Hungarians and 37 000 Croats are belie-
ved to have left the area for these reasons. The
growing number of refugees leaving Vojvodina
for Hungary, violation of Hungarian air space by
Yugoslav aircraft and the shelling of the Hunga-
rian town of Barcs have contributed to increasing
tension between Hungary and the Federal Repu-
blic of Yugoslavia. However the Hungarian
Government has, so far, managed to avoid direct
involvement in the conflict.
63. With regard to the Sandjak, straddling the
border between Serbia and Montenegro and
adjoining Bosnia and Kosovo, this impoverished
region has a majority Mus1im population which
identifies with the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzego-
vina. In a referendum on 25th-27th October
1991, held despite police obstruction and disrup-
tion, 98.9Vo of voters in the Serbian Sandjak
expressed themselves in favour of regional auto-
nomy and subsequent integration with another
republic, namely Bosnia Herzegovina. Shortly
thereafter the Sandjak leaders in Serbia declared
their autonomy. This was an obvious challenge
to Serb interests. As in Kosovo, rumours abound
in the Sandjak to the effect that the Serb authori-
ties in the region are endeavouring to remove
Muslims from posts of influence in politics and
administration and encroaching on Muslim pro-
perty. It appears that there is less tension in the
part of the Sandjak belonging to Montenegro.
However if open conflict were to break out in
Kosovo or cross the border from Bosnia-Herze-
govina, the Sandjak region would quickly
become involved.
64. In a referendum held in March 1992,66Vo
of the electorate of Montenegro voted in favour of
remaining in the Federal Republic of Serbia.
Nevertheless, relations with Belgrade are not
without tension, as it is feared by some in Monte-
negro that nationalist Serbs want federal union
with Montenegro and they are also hoping to
incorporate it into a Greater Serbia. Unlike Bel-
grade, Montenegro has stated that it is willing to
have an OSCE observer mission on its borders
with Bosnia-Herzegovina.
65. The closed and highly cenfralist mentality
of the Belgrade authorities was recently confir-
med by an article by the leader of the Serbian19. Neue Ztircher Zeit.ng,2Tth March 1995.
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socialists, Miharlo Markovic, which appeared in
the newspaper 'o Borba ", in which he argues that
the rights of nations and national minorities
should be even further curtailed'zo. He quotes the
example of countries such as " Bulgaria, Greece,
Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Serbia " which
are able to maintain their territorial integrity only
through repressive measures against the Chechen,
Hungarian, Turk or Albanian separatist move-
ments. As far as the Kosovo Albanians are
concerned, he argues that one must start by ack-
nowledging the fact that Kosovo is part of Serbia.
These alarming views must be challenged and
rejected by the international community.
66. As to the official policy of Belgrade, opi-
nions are divided on the future sffategy of Presi-
dent Milosevic. Some foresee a decisive battle
between Serbs and Croats in the event of a
UNPROFOR withdrawal, others feel that Mr.
Milosevic's frst priority is likely to be the lifting
of sanctions imposed on his country and its return
to the international community of states. There
are signs to suggest that the thinking in Belgrade
is also that it would not be in Mr. Milosevic's
interest to become involved in further war with
Croatia over the Croatian Serbs. According to
this view, Belgrade would not be opposed in prin-
ciple to Krajina being reintegrated into the Croa-
tian state, although this would not necessarily
mean that Belgrade was prepared to recognise
Croatia's pre-war borders. For that to happen,
Serbia is asking Croatia to recognise it as the sole
successor to former Yugoslavia and to settle the
status of the Krajina region.
67. Regarding the position of the internal oppo-
sition parties in Serbia which hold 123 seats out of
250 in the Belgrade Parliament, it must be noted
that these have widely differing views. Among
the latter are extreme nationalist elements whose
r6le is extremely negative. Other, more moderate
tendencies are trying to encourage Mr. Milose-
vic's government to take a more flexible attitude
towards negotiation. It also appears that the pres-
sure exerted by the government in Belgrade on all
forms of opposition, especially the independent
media, has intensified following the break with
the Bosnian Serbs. Many feel that Milosevic has
undermined the basis of his own legitimacy by no
longer fighting for a solution to the problem of
Serbia as a nation, i.e. the creation of a Greater
Serbia in which all Serbs would be united, but
solely for the lifting of international sanctions at
any pnce.
68. Indeed, there are many signs indicating thar
Mr. Milosevic is preparing to decide whether or
not to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina. Talks bet-
ween the Yugoslav Head of Government and Mr.
Filipovic, the Bosnian Ambassador to Switzer-
land, held in Belgrade in March 1995, seemed to
point in this direction. However, a month later,
Mr. Milosevic stated to contact group representa-
tives that there was no question of recbgnising
Bosnia-Herzegovina until the latter was tansfor-
med into a union of states that included the Serb-
held regions. Mr. Milosevic also asked for sanc-
tions to be lifted as a precondition of any
recognition2r.
69. Since the end of May 1995, there have been
many reports to the effect that Mr. Milosevic may
have accepted recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina
in principle. In particular, the American represen-
tative on the contact group, Mr. Frasure, hai nego-
tiated this question several times with Mr. Mflo-
sevic. However these rumours have given rise to
!frqng protest from the extreme right oppositionin Belgrade, which has denounced any lorm of
recognition as a betrayal of Serb interests.
Conversely, other opposition elements have stated
that they would support Mr. Milosevic if he were
to recognise Bosnia.
70. Nevertheless, it seems that hope largely
now rests on Mr. Milosevic. According to a
contact group proposal, recognition ofthe integri-
ty of Bosnia-Herzegovina's international borders
might be obtained by a partial lifting of the eco-
nomic sanctions against Belgrade for a period of
200 days. Arms and fuel deliveries alone would
continue to be prohibited. It is hoped by this reco-
gnition to further isolate the Serbs in Pile, but it is
impossible to foresee the consequences of such
recognition.
71. The influence of Mr. Milosevic over Serbs
in Pale and Krajina Serbs seems limited and his
true intentions are still not known. All the wes-
tern leaders have put pressure on him to use his
influence on the Pale leadership to obtain an
immediate release of the hostages. At the same
time, they have asked Russia to make representa-
tions to Belgrade in this connection. Iniuch cir-
cumstances, what will be the effect of the creation
of the rapid reaction force which has been decided
in Paris? Can Mr. Milosevic survive politically in
his own country if he abandons his project for a
Greater Serbia once and for all?
72. In this context, one must consider the pos-
sible extent of the r6le of the Orthodox Church
and the inJluence it exerts over the official policy
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia anh ats6
over the Serb authorities in Bosnia and the Kraji-
na and Slavonia regions. According to the politi-
cians your Rapporteur met during his talks in gel-
grade, the Orthodox Church would appear to be
one of the principal advocates of a Greaier Serbia.
The influence exerted by the Orthodox Church
throughout the counhry is perhaps therefore one of
20.Die Welt, 3rd February 1995.
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the reasons 
- 
or alibis 
- 
for Mr. Milosevic's hesi-
tation. The question is therefore how to avoid the
Orthodox Church becoming a major obstacle to
the peace process.
VI. The possibility of internatinnal efforts
pacifying the Ballcans
73. International activities to bring an end to
the war, particularly in Bosnia, are concentrated
on two main problems: first, the question of the
UNPROFOR mandate and the division of tasks
between the United Nations and NAIO in the
military management of the conflict and, second,
the search for a political solution, properly speak-
ing, acceptable to all concerned. Clearly these two
problems are closely linked.
74. The unease of the blue berets in the conflict
in Bosnia, as in other regions of former Yugosla-
via, has been described, inter alia, in a report by
the United Nations Secretary-General: Supple-
ment to an agenda for peace: position paper, pre-
sented by the Secretary-General on 3rd January
1995 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of
the United Nationsz. In this report, the Secretary-
General recalls that in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
oo Even though the use of force is authorised
under Chapter Vtr of the Charter, the Uni-
ted Nations remains neutral and impartial
between the warring parties, without a
mandate to stop the aggressor (if one can be
identified) or impose a cessation of hostili-
ties. Nor is this peace-keeping as practised
hitherto, because the hostilities continue
and there is often no agreement between
the warring parties on which a peace-keep-
ing mandate can be based. The safe areas
concept in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a
similar case. It too gives the United Nations
a humanitarian mandate under which the
use of force is authorised, but for limited
and local purposes and not to bring the war
to an end. "
75. It is precisely on this last point that major
differences between the United Nations and
NATO have arisen. Although the United Nations
mandate is in fact as limited as the above paragraph
describes, account must nevertheless be taken of
Security Council Resolution 836 of 4th June
1993,n which it was decided fust:
" to extend ... the mandate of UNPRO-
FOR in order to enable it, in the safe areas
... to deter attacks against [the latter] to
monitor the cease-fre, to promote the with-
drawal of military or paramilitary units
other than those of the Government of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to
occupy some key points on the ground, in
addition to participating in the delivery of
humanitarian relief to the population as
provided for in Resolution 776 (1992) of
14th September 1992;"
second:
" ... To make the adjustments or reinforce-
ment of UNPROFOR which might be
required by the implementation of the pre-
sent resolution, and to consider assigning
UNPROFOR elements in support of the
elements entrusted with protection of safe
areas, with the agreement of the govern-
ments contributing forces; "
third, to authorise:
" UNPROFOR, in addition to the mandate
defined in Resolutions 770 (1992) of 13th
August 1992 and 776 (1992), in carrying
out the mandate defined ... above, acting in
self-defence, to take the necessary mea-
sures, including the use of force, in reply to
bombardments against the safe areas by
any of the parties or to armed incursion into
them or in the event of any deliberate obs-
truction in or around those areas to the free-
dom of movement of UNPROFOR or of
protected humanitarian convoys; "
fourth, the Security Council decided:
" that ... member states, acting nationally or
through regional organisations or arrange-
ments, may take, under the authority of the
Security Council and subject to close co-ordi-
nation with the Secretary-General and
UNPROFOR, all necessary measures,
through the use of air power, in and around
the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovin4 to support UNPROFOR in the
performance of is mandate set out ... above. "
76. Finally, the Security Council requested the
member states concerned, in other words, prima-
rily those of the Atlantic Alliance, and the Secre-
tary-General and UNPROFOR to co-ordinate clo-
sely on the measures they were taking over the
arangements to implement the foregoing para-
graph. However, bearing in mind what has hap-
pened in the " safe area" around Bihac, for
example, implementation of Resolution 836 has
been a complete failure. Implementation of this
resolution also failed when the United Nations
authorities asked NAIO to carry out air strikes on
24thand26thN4ay 1995 around Sarajevo, since
the blue berets were not in a position to defend
themselves nor to prevent the Serbs from taking
some of them hostage. The decision taken in Paris
on 3rd June 1995 to create a rapid reaction force
might therefore be considered as a measure which
seeks to implement 
- 
somewhat belatedly 
- 
Secu-
rity Council Resolution 836.22. Document A/50/605/1995/1, 3rd January 1995.
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77. Many questions remain regarding the man-
date and status of this force. Under what type of
command is it to be placed? What will be iti rela-
tions with the United Nations, NATO or WEU?
Quite apart from the problem of the release of the
hostages, will this force have the task of ensuring
that the blue berets remain in Bosnia or will it
facilitate their withdrawal?
78. It appears finally to have been understood,
however, that NATO air srikes are useless, indeed
dangerous, without land forces that are sufficient-
ly large and well-armed in the field to repel
actions taken by those against whom the air
strikes were directed and protect the safe areas.
What must be avoided at all costs is that the new
rapid reaction force should be considered from
now on as the unit involved in the war. Conse-
quently, it is important to state clearly that its esta-
blishment is fully covered by Resolution 836 and
it remains for the members of the United Nations
Security Council to reach agreement on a new,
more specific mandate. However, the Security
Council's decision on the implementation of this
mandate has been delayed, the American
Congress having opposed American participation
in financing the rapid reaction force. Finally, on
16th June 1995, the Security Council voted a
resolution authorising the creation ofa rapid reac-
tion force of up to 12 500 troops. Russia and
China abstained. The resolution does not specify
the conditions under which this force will be
authorised to use its heavy weapons. Moreover, it
merely indicates that a decision on financing will
be taken later.
79. One might nevertheless wonder whether
this force will be really strong enough to carry out
the tasks it will have to shoulder. Moreover, what
r6le will be played by WEU, the only European
defence organisation involved in this matter? The
United States, whose official line changes vir-
tually from day to day as regards whether or not it
will be prepared to participate in action on the
ground in former Yugoslavia, has eventually
given to understand that it would become invol-
ved only if a possible withdrawal of the blue
berets called for military support. It is now there-
fore for Europeans to demonsffate whether or not
they are able to manage this crisis alone (with of
course the backing of the United Nations). Rus-
sia's attitude to the Paris decision is the major
unknown factor at the present time.
80. However, in attempting to reach agreement
on the best way to protect the safe areas, the pro-
blems encountered are not only those of co-ordi-
nation between the United Nations, NAIO and
WEU but also the fundamental problem that
consensus is as much lacking among the powers
represented at the Security Council as in the
Atlantic Alliance, the European Union or WEU,
over who are the aggressors, who are the aggres-
sed, who are the guilty parties and who are the
victims in this war. Preferably, reference is made
to " belligerents "o thus putting all the parties
involved in the hostilities on the same footing.
Preferences and sympathies linking those concer-
ned with either the Serbs, Croats or Bosnian Mus-
lims have invariably prevented common positions
being taken in regard to this conflict and also
when faced with the need to put forward a peace
plan acceptable to all concerned. As Mr. Cutileiro,
Secretary-General of WEU, observed recently in
an address to the Royal Institute for International
Relations, Brussels23:
o'Former Yugoslavia does show that in
1991 we had not yet reached a stage where
political agreement among us could have
led to swift and decisive collective action.
But it also shows 
- 
and this is more impor-
tant 
- 
that we had already reached a stage
where a conflict of that magnitude and clo-
seness to our borders was unable to make
us break ranks and come into confrontation
with each other. If we look back to history
this is a remarkable achievement. "
81. It may be said that we are no further for-
ward in 1995 than in 1991 
- 
and the danger of a
wider confrontation is still present. NAIO is the-
refore intensifying its preparation of contingency
plans in support of a possible withdrawal of the
blue berets. Yet a political solution which makes
no provision for supervision by United Nations
forces is unrealistic. Must the fighting be conti-
nued inexorably until the total collapse of all
sides?
82. The pursuit of political efforts to find a
solution to the conflict in Bosnia is still based on
the peace plan proposed on 5th Jv,ly 1994 by the
contact group of representatives of France, Ger-
many, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United
States: this plan allocated Sl%o of Bosnian terri-
tory to the Croatian-Muslim federation and 49Vo
to the Serbs, while envisaging that the state as a
whole should continue to exist within its recogni-
sed borders. The parliament of the Croatian-Mus-
lim federation accepted this proposal, but the Bos-
nian Serbs rejected it and demanded new
negotiations.
83. At the beginning of January, new initiatives
were taken by the contact group with a view to
offering the Bosnian Serbs the possibility of
amending the lines on the map drawn up on 5th
Jnly 1994 for dividing the territory between the
populations concerned. The Serbs had specifical-
ly laid claim to the Muslim enclaves of Srebreni-
ca and Gorazde together with part of the town of
Sarajevo. While the Bosnian Government rejec-
23. Western European Union 
- 
myth and reality. Address by
Mr. Jos6 Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU, Palais d'Eg-
mont, Brussels, Thursday,9th February 1995.
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ted any changes to the peace plan, Mr. Karadzic
reiterated the demand for the partition of the town
of Sarajevo.
84. After a six-month period of diplomatic iso-
lation of the Bosnian Serbs, contact group emissa-
ries resumed negotiations with them to try and
persuade them to accept the peace plan. More-
over, the American Government had informed the
Bosnian Government on 19th January 1995 that
the United States was prepared to resume talks
with the Bosnian Serbs, while emphasising that
this in no way called American support for the
contact group's plan into question2o. (This Ameri-
can initiative ran counter to Resolution 942 pas-
sed in September 1994 whereby the Security
Council prohibited such contacts for as long as the
Bosnian Serbs did not accept the peace plan.)
85. Following talks between the Americans
and the Bosnian Serbs, the latter appear to have
formulated new demands for control over the
whole of the town of Sarajevo and the Tuzla
industrial cenre and the division of the country
into two equal parts-.
86. For as long as the Serbs of Pale hold hos-
tages and continue shelling Sarajevo and for as
long as they are not willing to accept the existing
peace plan as a basis for negotiation, it is scarcely
conceivable that they should again be recognised
as partners in the negotiations that were broken
off on 25th January 1995. Nevertheless, on 5th
June 1995, the Greek Government sent its defence
minister to Pale to obtain the release of the hos-
tages.
87. One might wonder whether the time has
come to take up once again the French proposal
made at the end ofJanuary 1995 for convening a
summit that would bring together hesidents Slo-
bodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia, Alija Izetbegovic
of Bosnia and Franjo Tirdjman of Croatia under
the aegis of the European Union, the United
States and Russia in an attempt to take up the
threads of the dialogue on the whole range of pro-
blems that are still outstanding. On 6th February
1995, the European Union had agreed this propo-
sal, after having specified that such a meeting
might have as the frst agenda item mutual reco-
gnition of these three states. A further aim of the
meeting would be to reaffirm acceptance of the
contact group's plan on the division of territory
between the three Bosnian communities; in
exchange, suspension of sanctions against Yugo-
slavia might be offered to Mr. Milosevic and last-
ly, the summit meeting might ratify the most
recent international proposal for a settlement of
the conflict in Croatia between theZagreb autho-
rities and the Krajina Serbs.
24. Le Monde, 24th January 1995.
25.Die Welt, 24th January 1995.
88. The offer of a total suspension (rather than
lifting) of the sanctions imposed on Serbia by the
United Nations in May 1992 (with the exception
of the embargo on arms) was a crucial part of the
French proposal to revive the process of negotia-
tion over the whole range of conflicts in Croatia
and Bosnia, provided that Serbia agrees to reco-
gnise the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia within
their present borders which would amount to for-
mally renouncing the creation of a Greater Serbia.
89. However, for this offer to be valid, it is
necessary to ensure that the embargo really
works. It is also absolutely essential to convince
the Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group's
peace plan at a time when they feel strong enough
to keep by force the 70Vo Bosnian tenitory they
conffol at present. Mr. Milosevic's influence over
the Bosnian Serbs in this connection cannot be
relied upon any more than his political will to
exercise it.
90. Several proposals to modify the contact
group's peace plan have begun to circulate in the
press, either for creating a kind of confederation
of all the former components of Yugoslavia26 or
persuading the Bosnian Government to accept the
present front lines as borders and allow the Bos-
nian Serbs to form a confederation with Yugo-
slavia27.
91. Any uncertainty over the determination of
the international community to implement the
existing peace plan will strengthen the intransi-
gence of the Bosnian Serbs, but would the inter-
national community be prepared to implement the
peace plan by force? There is no indication what-
soever that the United Nations would be prepared
to give such a mandate to any intervention force.
Given the United States' reluctance to become
militarily involved in the Balkans, the Russian
Government's attitude is becoming ever more
important.
92. Russia is a member of the contact group
but does not always support joint approaches
developed in this framework. Moreover, it signed
a military co-operation agreement with Belgrade,
the content of which is unknown. This pact is due
to enter into force only after the lifting of sanc-
tions against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene$o)
and Moscow strongly supports the lifting of these
sanctions. The President of the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia has already expressed
concern about this pact. It should be noted that
Russia did not vote in favour of Security Council
Resolution 981, but instead abstained.
93. When Western European leaders pressed
the Russian President to use his influence to calm
26. See Flora Lewis, Intemational Herald Tribune, 19th May
1995. Die Zeit,3lst March 1995.
27. Intemational Herald Tribune, 20th May 1995.
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the situation around Sarajevo, he agreed to do
everything in his power on condition there was a
halt to NAIO air sffies in Bosnia, but in reality
Russia's efforts have been negligible; nor did it
react favourably to the creation of a European
rapid reaction force. In any event, Moscow wishes
to play a key r61e in settling the crisis and its
interests are not always the same as those of
Europeans.
VIL The rOle of WEU
94. WEU's political r6le in the conflict raging
in former Yugoslavia may be described as inexis-
tent; the organisation has in fact handed over all
responsibility in the matter to the authorities of
the European Union. As is clear from the flrst part
of the fortieth annual report of the Council2E, the
latter has done no more than keep informed of the
situation:
" The Greek Representative, on behalf
of the presidency of the Tlvelve, has regu-
larly briefed the Permanent Council on the
activities and d6marches of the European
Community aimed at reaching a peaceful
settlement of the conflict in former Yugo-
slavia. "
95. The Council's activities have focused spe-
cifically on the implementation of the Danube
embargo, operation Sharp Guard and WEU's poli-
ce contribution to the European Union's adminis-
tration of the town of Mostar. The extent of
WEU's marginalisation in political terms cannot
be better described than by the sentence in the
annual report stating that " WEU's involvement is
contingent upon the negotiations on Mostar bet-
ween the European Union's troika and the parties
on the spot o'. WEU has not even proved capable,
to date, of supplying the promised number of pol-
icemen for Mostar, in other words, 200 men!
96. However, the WEU Council of Ministers
used its Noordwijk declaration of 14th November
19942e to present a few political considerations
concerning this conflict. Thus, they agreed " on
the need for the United Nations Security Council
to consider the appropriate measures " (against
attacks on safe areas). They also stated their
conviction " that the fulI development of the fede-
ration of Bosnia and Herzegovina [was] an essen-
tial factor in a political settlement which should
be based on the principle ofbalanced treatrnent of
all the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina o'.
97. The ministers welcomed o' the important
decision by Belgrade to support the peace plan
[which one?] and close the border with Bosnia in
28. Document 1433,9th November 1994.
29. Document 143, lSth November 1994.
orderto make the Bosnian Serbs accept the plan ".
They furthernore asked that the contact group
should better inform 'o non-contact group mem-
bers who, through the conffibution of troops, mili-
tary assets or otherwise, contribute to the interna-
tional effort to restore peace in former Yugo-
slavia ". In conclusion, they thought it necessary
for appropriate measures to be envisaged for pre-
serving peace once it was restored in the Balkans,
without specifying what WEU's r6le should be in
such an eventuality, which is still far from immi-
nent.
98. At operational level, there is no longer any
question of WEU being involved in drawing up
contingency plans and the United Nation's sole
interlocutor in this respect is NATO. The Council
criticised the measures taken by the United States
for withdrawing from participation in the enforce-
ment of the arms embargo in the framework of
operation Sharp Guard, but when, in Written
Question 328, Mr. De Decker asked specifically
about the political consequences of this decision,
the Council's answer was very evasive. The clear
impression conveyed is that WEU's increasing
marginalisation with regard to former Yugoslavia
is not confined to political matters but extends
also to its r6le in the military management of the
crisis.
99. At the close of their meeting in Lisbon, the
WEU Ministers published a declaration on former
Yugoslavia which made no reference whatsoever
to WEU's r6le. Conversely, the Chief-of-Staff of
the French armed forces, Admimt Lanxade, stated
at the close of the Lisbon meeting that the worse-
ning of the situation in Bosnia and Croatia had
been the subject of a mere exchange of views bet-
ween a few WEU countries. In his view it was not
for WEU today to define policy on former Yugo-
slavia3o.
100. Marginalisation of WEU became total
when, on 3rd June 1995, France convened the
conference of the fifteen defence ministers of the
countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the Euro-
pean Union to take a decision on the creation of a
rapid reaction force in Bosnia. Apparently, WEU
involvement in this undertaking is in no way envi-
saged. Under such conditions, how can WEU
become the armedbranch of the European Union?
The question is still open, but seems of interest to
no one, with the exception of the Assembly.
VIII. Conclusions
101. As matters now stand, the main issue to be
decided is whether the blue berets should remain
in former Yugoslavia and under what terms. Des-
18
30. Agence France Presse, 15th May 1995.
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pite all the difficulties and the many humiliations
the United Nations forces have had to undergo, it
must not be forgoften that they have brought and
will continue to bring humanitarian aid, both very
necessary and irreplaceable, to the civilian popu-
lation in the areas of the fighting.
102. Even if up to now it has not been possible
to protect the United Nations safe areas in Bosnia
and Croatia, the psychological aspect of the pre-
sence of the blue berets providing a degree of
reassurance to the population should not be under-
estimated. A withdrawal of the blue berets would
probably lead to a massive exodus towards the
countries of Western Europe.
103. It is therefore necessary to make clear that
the purpose of deploying a rapid reaction force on
the spot is neither to prepare for the withdrawal of
the blue berets nor to allow the international com-
munity to side with one or other of the bellige-
rents, but better to protect the safe areas in accor-
dance with the present United Nations mandate
and specifically with Security Council Resolution
836. If a new Security Council mandate is neces-
sary for the rapid reaction force, this should pri-
marily serve to place the latter clearly under the
existing United Nations mandate, in other words
within the framework of Resolution 836; the wor-
ding should specifically state this.
104. It would also be desirable for other WEU
member countries to participate in some form or
other in the newly-created rapid reaction force
and for WEU to take responsibility for this force,
ensuring the necessary co-ordination with the
United Nations.
105. Apart from the question as to whether there
can be a partial suspension of the sanctions impe
sed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the
event of Yugoslavia recognising Bosnia and Croa-
tia, a lifting of the embargo on armaments and fuel
cannot be entertained until aI1 parties have agreed
to a peaceful solution of the conflict. Since it is
apparent that this embargo is constantly circum-
vented by illegal supplies through Albania and
Macedonia, it is essential to take vigorous mea-
sures to strengthen its effective implementation.
106. Once there is a multinational buffer force
truly in position between the belligerents, every
effort must be directed towards achieving a last-
ing cease-fre agreement throughout the territory
of former Yugoslavia as the precondition of a
peaceful and political settlement of the conflict
that can be accepted by all the parties concerned.
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